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RECENT TRENDS CURTAILING THE SUMMARY
CONTEMPT POWER IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
By CHARLES WILLIAm LUTHER
"The law ought to be so clear, that every individual may be able to look
to the statute book, and know whether, in any thing he may do, he acts
within the law or not."'
These wistful words were spoken by Representative Joseph Draper of
Virginia in the year 1830. In so speaking, he must have momentarily lapsed
into a utopian fairyland far away from the realities of a government which
of necessity must be administered "by men over men."' Representative
Draper was referring specifically to the problems the courts were having
in his time with criminal contempt. Notwithstanding Representative Dra-
per's demand for laws whereby "every individual in the community should
know what are the laws which he is bound to observe at the peril of his
liberty,"'3 the problems arising from criminal contempts are still far from
being solved.' The status of the present law with a view towards the domi-
nant trends represented therein is the subject of this comment. With due
respect to Representative Draper it is only fair to state that he did, with
seemingly prophetic wisdom, forsee that " . . . there will be difficulty in
defining contempts of court."5 On this point there has as yet been no dissent
from the legal authorities.
The Cammer Case Introduces a Novel Doctrine
The latest difficulty encountered is aptly exemplified in the Supreme
Court case of Cammer v. United States decided in March, 1956.6 In this
case the alleged contemnor, Cammer, was attorney for one Gold. In August,
1953 the grand jury for the District of Columbia returned an indictment
against Gold charging him with having falsely filed a non-communist affi-
davit in violation of 18 U. S. C. §1001. Subsequent to this indictment the
grand jury subpoenaed two of Mr. Gold's associates, ordering them to also
appear and produce specified documents. Cammer appeared in the District
Court on behalf of Gold's associates and moved to quash and vacate the
subpoenas served upon them. On this same day Cammer circulated from
New York identical questionnaires and letters to fifteen members of the
grand jury presently sitting who were also federal employees. In so doing,
1 7 CONG. DEB. 560, 561 (1830).
2 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, (Lodge ed. 1888) (Madison).
3 See note 1 supra.
4 See generally, THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 85-9 (1934) ; Forer, A Free
Press and a Fair Trial, 39 A.B.A.J. 800 (1955); Fox, Summary Process to Punish Contempt,
25 L.Q. REV. 238 (1909) ; Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Crimi-
nal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L.
R.v. 1010 (1924); Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 83 (1948).
5 See note 1 supra.
6 350 U.S. 399 (1956).
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Cammer acted without the knowledge or the permission of the District
Court. The questionnaires related generally to the effect of the govern-
ment's loyalty program on the federal employee-jurors i. e., those members
of the jury who were working for the United States government. The letter
accompanying the questionnaires stated that it was being sent for their per-
usal "in the interest of the fair administration of justice."17 The letter fur-
ther explained that Cammer did not desire any information regarding the
deliberations of the grand jury, but urged that it was the recipient's "duty
as a citizen to help enlighten the court on an issue which affects the liberty
of a citizen on trial in a criminal case.' 8
Ostensibly, all of the questions were related to the problem of ascer-
taining whether the federal employee-jurors were biased by prejudice or
fear to indict anyone charged with having affiliations with the Communist
Party. However, on closer examination the questions propounded reveal
obviously the inescapable impact on the grand jurors which was to in-
fluence their deliberationsY Because Cammer sent these searching ques-
tionnaires at a time when the grand jury was in the midst of considering
similar cases, the trial judge of the District Court ordered him to appear
and show cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt under 18
U. S. C. §401(2).'D Cammer freely admitted the above facts but argued
that his actions did not constitute contempt within the meaning of the
Federal Contempt Statute, which provides:
"A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or im-
prisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority and none
others, as
"(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto
as to obstruct the administration of justice;
"(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
7 Cammer v. United States, 223 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1955).8 Ibid.
9 Id. at n.3. Excerpts from some of the questions are as follows:
"Do you think it wise or safe for a government employee to express views on a contro-
versial question different from the position of the Government?
"Are you involved in a loyalty proceeding? Have you ever been involved in such a pro-
ceeding?
"Are you concerned about possible involvement in a loyalty proceeding in the future?
"Do you believe that a government employee might some day have to explain his action
in a loyalty proceeding if, as a juror, he voted to acquit or not to indict a person who was
widely publicized as a past or present communist?
"9Do you believe that a government employee's obligation to the Federal Government and
to its program of fight communism would be consistent with his voting to acquit or refuse to
indict a man officially charged by our Government with communist activity?
"Did you mention to or discuss the receipt of this questionnaire with any attorney or repre-
sentative of the Department of justice or with your superiors on your job? If so, with whom?"
10 See Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941). Although this case involves a violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 401(1), it presents valuable historical material.
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" (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule,
decree, or command." (Emphasis added.) 1
Relying also on the Supreme Court's statement in Dennis v. United
States that "preservation of the opportunity to prove actual bias is a guar-
antee of a defendant's right to an impartial jury"'2 Cammer said that this
alone would justify his actions. To substantiate this position he cited the
quotation in the Government's brief approved by the holding in Emspak v.
United States." It was to the effect that the defendant in that case was not
entitled to a hearing regarding alleged bias of government employees as
grand jurors because there was "nothing to prevent counsel, if he sees fit"
to contact the members of the grand jury and find out "whether or not
they had any.., bias toward the defendant."' 4
Nevertheless, in the Cammer case, the trial judge held that Cammer's
acts intolerably harassed the jurors and impinged upon their freedom of
thought, although admitting that "there seems to be reason to believe
respondent (Cammer) may have misconceived the proprieties."" Thus,
Cammer was found guilty of contempt under §401(2) and fined $100.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals the judgment was
affirmed with Fahy, J. dissenting. Justice Danaher pointed out for the
majority that
"If he had acted in good faith, he could have ... sought judicial super-
vision, instead of which he went forward with his plan, kept it secret to
himself, acted without advice from the court and... implied in his letter
that it was the juror's 'duty' to the court to respond to the question-
naires."16
The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice
Black, acknowledged that the proper construction of the statute in question
raised important questions, and certiorari was granted. The Court, after
tracing the historical background of the Federal Contempt Statute, con-
cluded that it was unnecessary to decide the question of whether or not
Cammer's acts constituted "an official transaction," since the Court held
that a lawyer is not a court "officer" within the meaning of §401 (2). Hence,
the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed.
Legislative Background of Contempt Statutes
This decision with its somewhat unique reading of the term "officers
of the court" is the latest development of a series of vexatious problems
beginning about 1828 and as a result of which Representative Draper made
the speech earlier quoted in part. Public attention was focused rather dra-
1118 U.S.C. § 401.
12339 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1950).
Is 203 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
14 Ibid.
15 In re Cammer, 122 F. Supp. 388, 389 (D.D.C. 1954).
10 223 F.2d 322, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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matically upon the problem in the United States 17 immediately after the
abortive impeachment proceedings against Federal Judge James H. Peck."8
Judge Peck, acting under the power of the Judiciary Act of 1789,19 had not
only disbarred but also imprisoned an attorney for publishing a criticism
of his opinion while a review was pending before a higher court. That Act
in that case allowed Federal courts to punish by fine or imprisonment, at
their discretion, all contempts of authority. Under the Act of 1789, Con-
gress had not attempted to define what would constitute contempt but left
this amorphous conception to the enlightened judicial discretion of the
individual judge. Thus, with this "royal prerogative" vested in one judge
acting out the roles of zealous District Attorney, impartial judge, objective
juror, and obedient executioner the stage was early set for judicial indiscre-
tion. Judge Peck, it appears, did not disappoint the legal audience. The
repercussions of this case were loud and immediate and almost all the
members of Congress who participated in the impeachment proceedings
against Peck were instrumental in bringing about the passage of the Act
of March 2, 1831.20 That act, which is substantially the same act presently
in effect, clearly attempted to curtail the previously undefined acts which
the courts might punish for contempt.2 Many optimistically hoped that
some good would come from the drastic action of Judge Peck and the re-
sultant legislation enacted. Just how effective the legislation actually was
in defining the acts of contempt is still the subject of controversy in the
courts and in the legal writings.2
To What Extent Has the Enacted Legislation Solved
the Problem?
With the peculiar historical background involved here, it might be
supposed that statutory enactments would have solved to a large extent the
problems of the federal courts in regard to their contempt powers. Such has
not been the fact. During the period from 1831 to the present time, the
judicial pendulum has shifted from one extreme to the other in the inter-
pretation of pertinent legislation. Beginning with a somewhat unnoticed
decision in 1835 by a Federal Circuit Court,2" the rule was laid down that
the statute in question was to be narrowly construed. The court held that
a trial judge had no "power" to punish a newspaper writer for contempt
for publishing an allegedly offensive article regarding a pending case.
The rationale for this holding was that the words in subsection 1 of §402,
1T For discussion of English law see Fox, CoNTEMPT oP CoURT (Oxford Press 1927).
18 For the detailed history of this famous episode, see STANSHuRY, RE:PORT or T= TRAL
01, JAMS H. PECK (1833); Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 4; Nelles and King, Contempt
by Publcaztion, 28 CoLum. L. REv. 401, 423-31 (1928).
19 1 Stat. 83 (1789).
20 4 Stat. 487 (1831).
21 See note 10 supra.
2 FRixPuR1R AND LANDIs, supra note 4; Comments, 2 STAN. L. REV. 763 (1950),
58 W.VA. L. REv. 88 (1955) ; Note, 7 HAsT. L.J. 312 (1955-56).
= 14 Fed. Cas. 380, No. 11,350 (C.C. Pa. 1835).
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"so near thereto," plainly referred to physical proximity. Under this test
the question is whether the acts were committed near the court in a geo-
graphical sense; and the fact that the acts were connected causally with
the functioning of the court was deemed of no consequence. The Supreme
Court in 1918 took an entirely different view of subsection 1. In the land-
mark case of Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States24 it was held that
a reasonable tendency to obstruct justice irrespective of geographical near-
ness was sufficient to support the federal contempt power. This rule an-
nounced in the Toledo case remained unaltered for twenty-two years until
the court decided Nye v. United States." In this case the Supreme Court
completely reversed its position, confessed to historical inaccuracies in the
Toledo case, and stated that legal scholars26 had plainly demonstrated
that the court was there mistaken. Hence, the rule of "physical proximity"
in construing subsection 1, and by implication the rule of narrowly con-
struing the complete statute, was re-established.
Since the Toledo case the Supreme Court has staunchly adhered to its
strict interpretation of the contempt power.' And now that the Cammer
case has been decided, one might well wonder if the Supreme Court has
gone the limit in its zeal to restrict federal contempt power.
Is an Attorney an. "Officer of the Court" Historically?
In analyzing the Cammer decision, it is readily seen that Justice Black
saw no reason for hesitating to state that "a lawyer is not a court officer
within the meaning of §401(2)."2 In so deciding, however, Justice Black
ventured no opinion as to whether or not the conduct was "an official trans-
action" within the meaning of the statute. Nor was the Court called upon to
decide whether Cammer's conduct was actually misbehavior. In his opinion,
Justice Black limited the word "officer" to mean the "group of persons
who serve as conventional court officers and are regularly treated as such
in the laws."2 9 The latter statement undoubtedly caused raised eyebrows
from legal-minded grammarians. Conspicuously omitted by Justice Black
was any further explanation of what was meant thereby. Only Mr. Justice
Reed, in concurring, admitted that the court had somewhat of a "unique
reading"3 of the term "officers of the court."
Whether or not the Court's interpretation of "officers of the court" is
entirely correct is a question of no small doubt. Beginning as early as
1866 in Ex parte Garland"' the Supreme Court has referred to attorneys as
24 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
25313 U.S. 33 (1941).
26 The Court was here referring to the article by Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 4.
27 See, e.g., In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943) ; Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412
(1943).
28 399 U.S. at 405.
29 Ibid.
3o Id. at 408.
3171 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
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being officers of the court. In Ex parte Wall32 Justice Bradley, in a disbar-
ment proceedings where the lawyer allegedly took part in a lynching dur-
ing the court's lunch hour, indignantly stated in the opinion:
"What sentiments ought such a spectacle to arouse in the breast of any
upright judge, when informed that one of the officers of his own court was
a leader in... such an. outrage?" (Emphasis supplied.)m3
In Booth v. Fletcher4 Justice Miller, in discussing the action of dis-
barring an attorney, stated:
"The lawyer is an officer of the court of whose bar he is a member." 35
To support this contention he cited as precedents the Garland and Wall
cases.
In Ex parte Davis,'6 the Circuit Court of the United States was dealing
with Section 725 of the Revised Statutes of the United States which read:
"The said courts shall have power to impose and administer all necessary
oaths, to punish, by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the court,
contempts for their authority: provided, that such power to punish con-
tempts shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehavior
of any person in their presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the admin-
istration of justice, the misbehavior of any of the officers of said courts in
their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any such
officer, or by any party, juror, witness, or other person .... ." (Emphasis
supplied.)
The court said that there was no doubt that".., the attorney... is one of
'the officers of the court, within the intent and meaning of the above
statute.
3 7
Numerous state decisions are readily found which support the conten-
tion that lawyers are officers of the court. In the case of In re Chappel, 6
the court stated that:
"The power to discipline attorneys who are 'officers of the court' is an
inherent power in courts . . . and one which is essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions." 39
In various opinions by the American Bar Association Committee and
the Canons of Professional Ethics, the statement is found that an attorney
is" ... an officer of the court." 4°
32107 U.S. 265 (1882).
331d. at 274.
u 101 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 628 (1938).
35 Id. at 680,
36 112 F. 139 (C.C. Fla. 1901).
S Id. at 140.
3833 N.E.2d 393 (1938).
89 Id. at 395. See also West v. Field, 181 Ga. 152, 181 S.E. 661 (1935) ; Schlitz v. Meyer,
61 Wis. 418, 21 N.W. 243 (1884). But see Bailey v. Williams, 6 Or. 71, 38 Pac. 71 (1876).
.
40 CANONS OF PROEESsIoNAL ETmcs, No. 22. See generally, DRINKER, LmGA. ETrcs
(1953).
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The traditional definitions found in the law dictionaries is to the effect
that an attorney is "an officer in a court of justice."'"
Cummings,42 in discussing the philosophy of disbarment and contempt,
says:
"The power of the court to impose fine or imprisonment for contempt
should be distinguished from disbarment proceedings. The primary object
of the former is to punish the offender; the purpose of the latter is to pro-
tect the courts, the bars, and the public.... The exercise of both powers
can be effectively sustained upon the principle that the attorney is an
officer of the court . . . . 43
These collected authorities without a doubt have been judicially tossed
to the wayside by the Supreme Court, thus reaffirming what the late Chief
Justice Hughes said in 1928, viz., "a federal statute finally means what the
(Supreme) Court says it means. 44
What Is the Future of Summary Contempt Power?
Even though it is conceded that the Supreme Court has not followed
the traditional definitions as to who is an officer of the court, the Cammer
case raises still much broader implications. The most important is that the
Supreme Court is apparently going to continue to interpret the statutory
regulation of contempt as a definite limitation upon judicial power. The
reasons in favor of this curtailment are obvious: In the summary contempt
proceedings as provided for under §401, the attorney in question is com-
pletely without the safeguards of a jury trial and the other normal court
procedures. The Supreme Court gave advance warning that this result
would be reached in decisions preceding the Cammer case, where they re-
peatedly stressed that the contempt power of the federal courts should be
strictly construed to avoid undue inroads into the procedural safeguards
of the Bill of Rights. 45
The Cammer decision also dispelled the fatuous dreams of the drafters
of the early contempt legislation, i.e., that legal certalnty can eliminate,
via codification, all judicial law-making. The Supreme Court in the past
has only too well demonstrated to us that courts in their interpretation of
statutes cannot avoid some judicial-law making.4
41 BLACK, LAW DIcTIoNARY (4th ed. 1951).
42 Cummings, The Lawyer Criminal, 20 A.B.A.J. 82 (1934). See also SToNE, LAW AND ITS
ADmTNSTRTION at 163 (1915).
43 CummiNGs, supra note 42, at 83.
44 Quoted by Justice Frank in Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 621 (2d Cir. 1944).
45 In re Mitchell, 326 U.S. 224 (1945). See cases cited in Farese v. United States, 209 F.2d
312 (1st Cir. 1954).4 6 A most amazing example of this is found in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
254 U.S. 443 (1921) construing away a legislative victory labor had won in the Clayton Act
of 1914. In 1941 the Supreme Court, in referring to the Duplex case, said: "It was widely be-
lieved that into the Clayton Act courts read the very beliefs which that Act was designed to
remove." United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 230 (1941).
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Fortunately or unfortunately, depending upon the view one takes of
the case, the Cammer decision plainly shows that judicial law making is
not always modest in scope. While legal uncertainty to the extent of putting
entirely new meanings into well-settled legal definitions is to be deplored, it
is submitted that the grave possibility of abuse which is so inherent in
such a drastic power as summary contempt was ample justification for
the Supreme Court's striking interpretation of "an officer of the court."
